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Atheistic and Christian 
Existentialism: A Comparison of 
Sartre and Marcel 
 
Thomas C. Anderson 





In Existentialism and Humanism Jean-Paul Sartre states that 
there are “two kinds of existentialists,” the atheistic, in which he 
includes himself, and the Christian, among whom he includes his fellow 
countryman Gabriel Marcel.1 Needless to say, these two existentialists 
significantly disagree on many things and yet, surprisingly, they also 
have notable areas of agreement, as we shall see. The purpose of this 
paper is to compare the views of the two men on a number of 
important philosophical issues. My comparison is aided by the fact that 
Sartre and Marcel knew each other personally and occasionally directly 
commented in writing on each other’s ideas.  
First, some information about their history and personal 
relationship. Both men were born, Marcel in 1889, Sartre in 1905, and 
for the most part lived and wrote in Paris. Marcel was sixteen years 
older than Sartre and died seven years earlier, in 1973. Each of them 
studied in Paris (Sartre at L’ecole normale superior, Marcel at the 
Sorbonne) and after passing the agrégation held various teaching 
positions in France for a few years. They probably first met at the very 
popular informal philosophical gatherings Marcel hosted almost weekly 
at his home beginning in the 1940s after the end of World War II. 
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Marcel, Beauvoir, and others refer to those get-togethers and mention 
that the young Sartre presented papers there. Marcel also says that at 
that time relations among the three of them were cordial.2 In fact, 
Marcel was one of the first French thinkers to review some of Sartre’s 
early works and to insist that his thought was “powerful and 
important.” He also stated that he was “happy and proud” to have 
suggested certain topics to Sartre that he subsequently pursued. 
Marcel also praised Sartre for some of his analyses of concrete 
examples, especially for his “phenomenological study of the other.”3  
According to Marcel, a break between them occurred because of 
their sharp disagreement over the trials and purges that were carried 
out in France after the second world war.4 He complained that the so-
called courts of justice which tried and passed sentences on alleged 
collaborators were often composed of men and women who, because 
of their sufferings during the occupation, could hardly be fair and 
impartial in their verdicts. Sartre and the existentialists, who were 
very popular at that time, in effect supported those courts by cynically 
challenging traditional principles of fairness and impartiality. 
Unfortunately, the two men remained estranged for the rest of their 
lives.  
I should add that both men were heavily influenced by the 
phenomenological movement initiated by Edmund Husserl in the early 
twentieth century. The philosophical “method” each adopted consisted 
in carefully reflecting on and describing phenomena (acts of 
consciousness or their objects) as they appear and are lived in 
ordinary human experiences of our self and of our world. The goal of 
such descriptions is ultimately to bring to light the essential structures 
of what is present in experience.  
My procedure in discussing some major areas of philosophical 
disagreement between the two will be as follows:  
A. I will set out positions that Sartre apparently adopts and 
explain why he adopts them.  
B. I will present Marcel’s criticism of those positions and offer 
his alternative(s).  
C. I will evaluate the validity of Marcel’s criticisms.  
 
Ontology  
A. Sartre’s position: I begin with Sartre’s classification of being 
set forth in Being and Nothingness and other early works. As the result 
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of what he claims is phenomenological analysis, he divides all reality 
into just two realms, being-for-itself (human consciousness) and 
being-in-itself.5 Consciousness is described as nonsubstantial and 
contentless, that is, as “entirely activity and spontaneity,” “self-
determining,” “self-activated” and, therefore, free.6 Being-in-itself, on 
the other hand, is passive and inert, so identical with itself and filled 
with being that it is a totally undifferentiated, full positivity of being. 
These two realms are “absolutely separated regions of being,” Sartre 
claims, because being-in-itself is so filled with being “that it does not 
enter into any connection with what is not itself.” It is “isolated in its 
being.”7 While he grants that there are relations which in a sense unite 
the two kinds of being, such relations are only one way. Only 
consciousness is related to being inasmuch as it exists only as 
consciousness of being. Being in itself has no relation with 
consciousness nor, strictly speaking, even with itself. It simply “is 
itself‟ and “glued to itself‟ as a full positivity of being.8  
One important result of Sartre’s definition of being in itself as 
one with itself and “isolated” in its being is that being for itself, human 
consciousness, is totally free from any influence of being in itself. The 
relation of consciousness to being is entirely negative. “Consciousness 
of something” ultimately involves “not being that being” and this, 
Sartre says, preserves consciousness from being affected by the 
beings it is aware of.9  
Accordingly, when we turn to his most extensive treatment of 
freedom and its relation to other things and people in Part IV, Chapter 
One of Being and Nothingness, we find Sartre insisting on the total 
freedom of consciousness or being for itself and of human reality. He 
minimizes to the point of denial any limitations of human freedom and 
speaks of it as “absolute,” “total,” “infinite,” and “without limits.” Note 
the following statement: “Man can not be sometimes slave and 
sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all.”10  
B. Marcel’s criticism: Marcel objects to Sartre’s division of reality 
into two realms of being absolutely separate from each other and he 
also rejects Sartre’s claim that he arrived at that division by 
phenomenological analysis. On the basis of his own reflections on 
experience, Marcel denies that human reality is isolated from the 
things of this world and that worldly things have no impact on human 
beings and their consciousnesses. He insists instead on their 
“participation” with each other, meaning by that that humans are 
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neither isolated from things of the world nor from other human beings 
but are essentially connected to both. The result is that things can not 
only affect and change me externally (e.g. fire can burn me), they can 
affect me “internally” in my thoughts, feelings, and choices. Every 
human being is to some degree in union with or bound to what is not 
oneself. We are “beings-in-the-world,” he states, and so are 
fundamentally dependent on others and on the world. Our being is 
totally exposed, vulnerable, and permeable to the things and people 
among which we exist.11 “I am in the world,” he writes, “only insofar 
as the world ... [is] something shaping me as in a womb” and a kind of 
“primordial bond ... unites the human being to a particular, 
determined, and concrete environment.”12 The concrete situations of 
our lives are not objective facts which exist independent of us. The 
person I am and have become is to a great extent the result of the 
particular circumstances with which I have lived and interacted 
throughout the course of my life. Of course, the other human beings I 
have encountered, in particular my family and friends, have especially 
influenced me externally and internally. Thus, Marcel categorically 
rejects Being and Nothingness’s claim that human freedom is total, 
unlimited, and absolute. Reflection on the given facts of human 
experience have not forced Sartre to his conclusions, he states, his 
ontological presuppositions have.13 An unbiased look at our lived 
experience reveals that human beings and their freedoms are affected 
and limited, sometimes severely, by the many people and things they 
encounter in the world.  
C. Evaluation of Marcel’s criticisms: I believe that Marcel’s 
critiques of the ontology of Being and Nothingness are well taken. But 
I must immediately add that by 1960, when the Critique of Dialectical 
Reason was published, Sartre had made it abundantly clear that he 
himself had significantly modified much of his earlier ontology and its 
description of two separate realms of being. While he generally 
continues to divide reality into human beings and nonhuman things, he 
affirms his agreement with Marx that the relations between human 
organisms and each other and the world are dialectical in nature. That 
is, there is mutual interaction and causation between humans and the 
world and that can significantly restrict an individual’s freedom. 
Indeed, the Critique’s purpose, Sartre says, is to show the presence of 
the dialectic in human history starting from humans acting on the 
world to fulfill their needs and the things of the world in turn acting or 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
New Perspectives in Sartre, (2010): pg. 44-63. Publisher Link. This article is © Cambridge Scholars Publishing and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
5 
 
reacting on human beings.14 The hundreds of pages of the Critique 
contain an abundance of illustrations of the myriad dialectical relations 
between human beings and the physical world and other human 
beings and the social, political, economic, and cultural structures they 
create. Lest there be any doubt, Sartre explicitly repudiates his earlier 
view that human freedom is absolute or unlimited: “it would be quite 
wrong to interpret me as saying that man is free in all situations ... I 
mean the exact opposite: all men are slaves insofar as their life 
unfolds in the practico-inert field,” that is, in the field comprised of 
physical things and sodal structures shaped by human activity. He 
mentions such things as one’s class, standard of living, type of work, 
specific culture. In general the practico-inert is “a determinate 
provision of material and intellectual tools; it is a strictly limited field 
of possibilities.”15  
The conclusion to draw, then, is that Marcel’s (and many 
others‟) criticisms of Sartre‟ s early ontology in Being and Nothingness 
while accurate, do not apply to Sartre’s later, 1960, dialectical vision of 
reality, a vision which explicitly rejected the description of two 
separate regions of being he set forth earlier. No doubt, the criticisms 
that Marcel and others made of that bifurcation of being were at least 
partly responsible for the changes Sartre made in his ontology.16  
 
The Nature and Source of Value  
A. Sartre’s position: In Being and Nothingness Sartre makes it 
very clear that he believes all values are human creations. He rejects 
what he calls “the spirit of seriousness,” the view that some values are 
objective or, as he puts it, “written in things.” Seriousness maintains 
that justice and honesty, for example, possess value independent of 
human choices or desires. It also claims that human beings have 
intrinsic value. In other words, even if no one chooses to value justice 
or to value human beings, the serious person insists they possess 
objective, inherent worth. For the spirit of seriousness, individual 
values are “transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity.”17  
Sartre, for his part, calls people cowards in bad faith who, in 
order to avoid recognizing their freedom, hide from themselves the 
fact that man “is the being by whom values exist” and that “his 
freedom [is] ... the unique source of value.”18 In his essay 
“Existentialism and Humanism” Sartre roots the absence of objective 
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values in atheism. There is no God to create or decree anything to be 
of value. I will quote him at some length: 
 
The [atheistic] existentialist...thinks it very distressing that God 
does not exist, because all possibility of finding values in a 
heaven of ideas disappears along with Him .... Nowhere is it 
written that the good exists, that we must be honest, that we 
must not lie, because the fact is we are now on a plane where 
there are only men.  
 
And he goes on to point out the consequences: “Dostoevsky 
said, ‘If God did not exist, everything would be permitted.’ That is the 
very starting point for existentialism. Indeed, everything is permissible 
if God does not exist.”19  
Sartre is equally clear in Being and Nothingness about what 
results from the denial of objective values. Since only human freedom 
is the source of values, he writes, that “paralyzes” and “relativizes” 
ethics, for it means that whatever one freely chooses to value, 
whether justice or injustice, will thereby be of value. “My freedom is 
the sole foundation of values,” he claims, and as a result “nothing, 
absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, 
this or that particular scale of values.”20 I cannot appeal to any 
objective value criterion, such as God’s law, to justify the values I 
choose since that criterion itself would be of value only if I freely 
choose it to be.  
In his more technical discussion of the nature and source of 
values in Being and Nothingness, Sartre argues that values are 
experienced as norms or imperatives and as such they are not real but 
demands to be made real. Values are not facts or what is the case but 
norms expressing what should be. But if values are demands beyond 
what is, their reality can come only from a being that can go beyond 
what is and grasp what is not. Such a being is, of course, being for 
itself or human consciousness insofar as it is free to transcend what is 
and grasp what is not. Hence human freedom is the source of all 
values.21  
B. Marcel’s criticisms: There are basically two criticisms of 
Sartre’s subjectivist position on values offered by Marcel. The first is 
the very traditional one which argues that the consequences would be 
disastrous if all values are only the creation of human freedom. “The 
way would then lie open to the worst abuses and abominations”22 for 
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one could freely choose to value sexual abuse, slavery, and genocide. 
To be sure, others could freely choose to value love, justice, and 
peace. But there would be absolutely no basis for claiming that one set 
of values is any better (more valuable) than another. As Sartre says, 
“nothing justifies me in adopting this or that value, this or that set of 
values.” Simply put, if all values are created by human freedom, then 
anything, no matter how horrific, could be made valuable by that 
freedom.  
Marcel’s second criticism is from a phenomenological 
perspective, a perspective which, as we have noted, Sartre himself 
claims to adopt. If we reflect honestly on our experiences of values, 
Marcel claims, we will find that we do not experience them to be our 
free creations but we recognize them as imposed on us: “If I examine 
myself honestly and without reference to any preconceived body of 
ideas, I find that I do not “choose‟ my values at all but that I 
recognize them.” Indeed, “value is essentially something which does 
not allow itself to be chosen.”23 I understand that to mean that when I 
experience or recognize something as valuable, such as the lives of 
innocent children, and, therefore, morally condemn enslaving them, 
my experience/recognition is that the value of those children is not up 
to my free choice. Rather, their value appears in them, whether one 
chooses to recognize it or not, and even if one wishes it weren’t there. 
If Sartre were correct and values were my free creations, I could 
simply choose not to value the lives of those innocent children and 
they would then possess no value. (I might refuse to confer value on 
them in order to avoid any personal responsibility for defending them.) 
But when children’s lives appear to me to possess values, my 
experience is that those lives demand to be recognized and defended. 
Even if I turn my back on them, their intrinsic value continues to tug 
at me.  
Perhaps a stronger argument for the objective reality of values 
can be found in Marcel’s reflections on human experiences of loving 
fidelity.24 He notes that some people commit themselves 
unconditionally to faithfully love other human beings, such as their 
spouses, children, and friends, even to the extent of putting their lives 
on the line for them. Others commit themselves unconditionally to 
causes such as freedom or peace and are willing to live and die for 
them. Now what could explain why some offer pledges of unconditional 
fidelity and love to other humans or to causes? Marcel answers that 
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unconditional loving fidelity makes sense only if those who make such 
commitments experience the presence of unconditional value in those 
people or causes. Furthermore, those values must be intrinsically 
present in my spouse and children or in peace for if they issue from 
human freedom as Sartre claims, then they can be removed by human 
freedom. As I said above, if it became too dangerous for me to assign 
value to something or someone, I could simply freely decide that they 
have no value and they would have none. Indeed, to offer 
unconditional love and fidelity to someone or something whose value 
comes from human freedom and so can be removed by human 
freedom seems foolish in the extreme. Those who pledge themselves 
unconditionally to others and /or causes are fundamentally deluded 
and foolish. In a Sartrean universe the most heroic human acts of self-
sacrifice are utterly incomprehensible. How can Sartre praise the 
heroes of the French resistance movement during WWII and condemn 
the Nazis, Marcel asks, if there are no objective values such as 
courage and justice?25 I might add that Sartre’s own efforts on behalf 
of the Algerian freedom fighters, efforts which he undertook in 
conditions which posed great danger to his life, also seem hard to 
reconcile with his claim that nothing has objective or intrinsic value.  
C. Evaluation of Marcel’s criticisms: Twenty years after the 
publication of his 1943 phenomenological ontology, in 1964, Sartre 
presented a public lecture in Rome in which he set out at some length 
what he later called his second ethics. That designation distinguished it 
from his first ethics written in the 1940s and based on Being and 
Nothingness. He begins this public lecture by stating that the “central 
fact” of moral experience is its normative character. Every moral 
prescription, imperative, value and norm which we experience 
presents itself to us as demanding our obedience. Values and norms 
appear to us as moral duties, requirements, and obligations which we 
should follow and obey. They are not descriptions of facts but 
prescriptions of conduct.26 Thus, by the time of this later work, Sartre 
agrees with Marcel that values are experienced as prescriptions 
imposed on us and not as our free creations. What, he asks, is the 
source of these values/norms? He answers, human needs: “The root of 
morality is in need.”27 Needs, Sartre explains, are not just the lack of 
something or other. They are felt exigencies, felt (at least obscurely) 
demands for satisfaction. Since we have various needs which demand 
to be satisfied, we experience certain objects (e.g. food, health, 
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knowledge, love) to be valuable and so to be norms and demands that 
we should attempt to realize. Ultimately we experience the human 
organism itself with needs fulfilled as our normative future, that is, as 
the highest end and supreme value we should obtain. “Need posits 
man as his own end,” Sartre states. Note that that ultimate end, norm 
and value, the human being with its needs satisfied, is not something 
we freely select or can reject; it is “given” and “imposed” (Sartre’s 
terms) on us by our needs.”28  
Furthermore, since humans are a specific kind of organism 
having specific needs, certain specific kinds of objects are necessary to 
fulfill those needs. Since we do not freely choose the needs we have, 
we can not freely choose the general kind of things which fulfill those 
needs. Sartre mentions needs for oxygen and protein, for freedom and 
love, for other human beings and culture, for a meaningful life. And it 
is because we need them that oxygen, protein, freedom, love, culture, 
and so forth are experienced by us as having to be attained, that is, as 
values and norms. Again, these are “given,” “assigned,” and “imposed” 
on us, Sartre asserts.29  
Clearly, then, in the 1960s Sartre grants an objectivity to values 
that his earlier work did not. That objectivity does not come from 
some transcendent being or realm, it issues from our actual human 
needs. That objectivity gives values/norms an independence from 
human freedom since our choices can neither create nor remove the 
value of certain objects. Protein and love are valuable for the organism 
we are whether or not we freely choose them to be or want them to 
be.  
We have here, then, another instance where Marcel’s criticisms 
of Sartre’s ideas apply only to the early Sartre and his early ontology. 
It may be that those criticisms were noted by Sartre and helped to 
prompt the change in his understanding of the source and nature of 
values. In any case, rooting values in human needs is significantly 
different from considering them to be the creations of human 
freedom.30  
Still, there remains a difference between the two men in the 
“seriousness,” to use Sartre’s term, which each ascribes to values. 
Rooting them in human needs is different from grounding them in a 
Creator of human beings as Marcel does. While he would certainly 
applaud Sartre’s move granting more objectivity to values, I suspect 
Marcel would still maintain that he has not fully accounted for their 
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prescriptive, normative, obligatory character and in particular for the 
unconditional, unlimited value that human beings themselves possess. 
For Sartre human beings are objectively of value because their 
fulfillment, the satisfaction of their needs, is in fact their ultimate goal. 
For Marcel finite human beings ultimately possess unconditional value 
because they are gifts of a being who is infinite value itself, namely a 
loving creator, an absolute Thou.31 (More on this in Section V.) In the 
final analysis human beings remain the source of all values, including 
their own, for Sartre. Because the value of human beings is God given 
for Marcel, humans have significantly more worth and dignity in his 
universe. Likewise, since the ultimate source of their value and dignity 
is God, not human beings, the obligation to respect human beings and 
promote their well-being is, I would think, much stronger and more 
serious in Marcel’s world than it is in Sartre’s.  
 
The Meaning of Life  
A. Sartre’s position: In the final pages of Being and Nothingness 
Sartre draws some grim conclusions from the view of human reality he 
has set forth in that work. He reviews something he established 
earlier, namely, that the ultimate value and goal humans seek is to be 
God. Insofar as human reality is radically unnecessary, contingent, it 
desires to be necessary. As he puts it, we want to exist “by right, “not 
as we do, purely “by chance.” At the same time, in order to preserve 
our freedom, we want to give ourselves this right or necessity. If we 
receive necessity from some external cause such as God, that would 
make us simply a pawn in his cosmic plan. Now to desire to be a being 
who would justify its own existence by causing itself to be necessary 
and not by chance, is to desire to be a being which would cause itself 
to be, an ens causa sui, which Sartre calls God. Of course, a being that 
would be both necessary and free is impossible because self-
contradictory. And so he concludes that our fundamental desire to be 
God, to be a being which would freely cause itself to be necessary, is 
in vain, a “useless passion.” Since there is no way we can fulfill that 
passion, the result is that “human reality is by nature an unhappy 
consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state.”32 
 
We are condemned to despair; for all human activities are 
equivalent (for they all tend to sacrifice man in order that the 
self-cause may arise and all are on principle doomed to failure). 
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Thus it amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk 
alone or is a leader of nations.33  
 
In other words, no matter how we attempt to be God, that is, to 
cause ourselves to exist by necessity, by right rather than by chance, 
whether it be drugs or political power or anything else, we are doomed 
to fail. When all is said and done we have no reason for our existence, 
we are contingent, entirely by chance.  
B. Marcel’s criticism: In his reviews of Sartre’s early works 
Marcel often cites Sartre’s statements (such as those in the previous 
section) that human existence is “doomed to failure.” He recognizes 
that in Being and Nothingness Sartre comes to that conclusion because 
he believes that every human being seeks an unreachable goal, the 
“divinisation of himself” by “attaining to the dignity of the self-
cause.”34 Not only this but as we saw in the previous section the early 
Sartre holds that nothing, not even human beings, possesses any 
inherent value or dignity. Accordingly, Marcel labels Sartre’s position 
“nihilism” and says that it expresses a “degraded view” which 
“devalues” human existence. It is a “systematic vilification of man,” for 
“to vilify a thing is to take away its value.” Using unusually strong 
language, Marcel writes, “It is not at all surprising that in it [Sartre’s 
philosophy] man should conceive of himself more and more as waste 
matter or as potential excrement!”35  
C. Evaluation of Marcel’s criticism: It is true that Sartre never 
wavers in believing that human beings naturally desire the 
unattainable goal of being the total cause of themselves so that they 
exist by right, by necessity. However, contrary to what Marcel thinks, 
Sartre does not agree that seeking that impossible goal must render 
human life valueless or meaningless or doomed to failure. Rather, by 
our own free choices and those of others we can create meaningful, 
valuable lives for ourselves and others. Sartre makes this very clear in 
his early essay, “Existentialism and Humanism,” written three years 
after Being and Nothingness. “Life has no meaning a priori,” he states, 
“it’s up to you to give it meaning, and value is nothing else but the 
meaning you choose.”36 Even though human life possesses no 
objective or intrinsic value or meaning, we ourselves can freely confer 
value on it. Recall that in his early ontology Sartre argued that human 
freedom is the only source of values. It follows, then, that if humans 
freely choose to value their lives, those lives will become valuable. In 
his Notebooks for an Ethics (written in the late 40s, published 
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posthumously) he puts this in terms of justification. Human beings can 
justify their lives, he says, by undertaking conversion, which means by 
ceasing to value, or working to attain, the impossible causa sui and 
choosing instead to give value to attainable goals such as human life 
itself.37 More specifically, he recommends that we choose to value and 
promote the corning of a classless society embodying democratic 
socialism, also called “the city of ends.” This would be a society where 
everyone chooses to confer value on his/her own existence and on 
everyone else‟s.38  
In his last work, The Family Idiot, he takes the same position. 
As unnecessary and finite, human beings seek a meaning and purpose 
to their lives that would confer necessity on them. We desire the 
absolute, the infinite, Sartre writes, a mandate for our lives that comes 
from an infinite being who created us for some purpose in his grand 
design and thereby justifies our being. He labels this desire the 
“religious instinct” and, of course, says it can not be satisfied: 
“Finitude makes them [creatures] mad for an unattainable infinite,” he 
states. “Being created us in such a way that we can neither find it nor 
give up the search.”39 Once again it remains up to human beings 
themselves to confer meaning and purpose on their lives: “sense and 
non-sense in a human life are human in principle and come to the child 
of man from man himself.” The most meaningful lives we can achieve 
will be ones where we cooperate to create our common humanity by 
constructing societies that fulfill our common human needs.40  
Thus Marcel’s criticism that Sartre is a nihilist who degrades and 
vilifies human existence by denying it any value and dooming it to 
failure and meaninglessness is flagrantly wrong. At no time in his life 
did Sartre believe that human beings were inevitably doomed to 
valueless, meaningless lives. As we have seen, in his early ontology he 
insisted that humans themselves can make their lives meaningful and 
in later works he argued that was best accomplished by human beings 
working together to fulfill their needs. That being said, it also remains 
true that throughout his life Sartre maintained that the ultimate goal 
humans desire is to be God or to possess a totally justified existence, 
and that is not achievable. Since that is the case, I suspect that Marcel 
would continue to insist that in the final analysis human existence for 
Sartre is fated to be in despair and doomed to failure. While together 
we ourselves certainly can confer on our lives a richness of meaning 
and value, that can not cover up the fact that at the deepest level of 
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our being we long for a fullness of meaning and a complete 
justification of our existence that we can never attain.  
 
Human Relations  
A. Sartre’s position: To say that Being and Nothingness dwells 
on the negative side of relations among human beings is an 
understatement. Sartre describes there many human interactions in 
great detail and argues that in every case, including love, they are 
attempts of one or more subjects to dominate or be dominated by 
others. Accordingly, he insists that conflict is the fundamental relation 
among subjects. “Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others,” 
he writes, „„the essence of the relations between consciousnesses is 
not the Mitsein, it is conflict.”41  
On the ontological level, Sartre emphasizes conflict in order to 
stress the irreducible separateness of each individual from others, a 
separateness that can never be overcome by merging consciousnesses 
together into some supra-individual union. “So long as 
consciousnesses exist,” he asserts, “the separation and conflict of 
consciousnesses will remain.”42  
On the epistemological level, he believes that for one subject to 
be aware of another subject necessarily involves grasping that other 
subject as a thing-like object—and that is a degradation of him or her. 
Sartre also calls the objectification of another subject an “alienation” 
and “enslavement” of him or her. It is a degradation, alienation, and 
enslavement because the other free subject cannot control how I 
objectify it, that is, the other’s freedom cannot control how I evaluate 
and judge him or her.43 And since neither subject wants to be turned 
into a thing-like object, conflict between them is inevitable. It is 
inevitable too because no subject-to-subject relation between human 
beings is possible. Either I recognize the other as a free subject who 
objectifies and degrades me or I recognize myself as a free subject 
who objectifies and degrades the other. “No synthesis of these two 
forms is possible,” Sartre maintains. To apprehend the other as both a 
free subject and an object is an “impossible ideal.” “We shall never 
place ourselves ... on the plane where the recognition of the other’s 
freedom would involve the other’s recognition of our freedom.” Thus, 
he concludes his detailed descriptions of concrete human relations 
from love to hate by reasserting, “It is useless, therefore, for human 
reality to seek to get out of this dilemma: one must either transcend 
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[objectify] the other or allow oneself to be transcended [objectified] by 
him.”44 This is summed up in his famous line, “the essence of the 
relations between consciousnesses is not the Mitsein, it is conflict.”  
B. Marcel’s criticisms: Marcel is just one of a countless number 
of commentators who objected that Being and Nothingness’s 
descriptions of human relations were extremely one-sided. While he 
concedes that some of Sartre’s analyses are “masterful,” Marcel is 
particularly critical of his description of love even going so far as to say 
that the author of Being and Nothingness “has nowhere succeeded 
...in conceiving it [love].”45 Since he admits no possibility of subject to 
subject relations, love for Sartre is just one of many attempts of a free 
subject to dominate another.  
As we just saw, all human relations are of the subject to object 
kind for Sartre and to make an object of a subject is to reify it and, 
therefore, to degrade, alienate, and enslave it. One of Marcel’s 
responses to Sartre is simply that not all objectification of another 
involves a degradation of them or an enslavement of their freedom. I 
can be conscious of another (and, therefore, make them my object) 
with approval, respect, and love, and desire to assist them in 
becoming more free. Love, in particular, is not an attempt to dominate 
others or to control their freedom, Marcel says, but an attempt to 
enter into communion with them, to participate in their very being. 
Love is a true subject-to-subject or intersubjective relation.46 One of 
Marcel’s preferred ways of expressing that intersubjectivity is to 
designate love in all its forms (friendship, filial, maternal, etc.) as an I-
thou rather than an I-you or I-him/her/it relation. The latter are 
subject to object relations; I-thou are subject to subject. (The English 
word thou is used to translate the familiar and intimate form of the 
pronoun you in French, tu instead of vous.) Furthermore, for Marcel I-
thou relations involve a real union or communion of subjects, a union 
which recognizes the other subject “as a being endowed with a dignity 
and reality of his [and her] own.”47 This is precisely the kind of 
relationship which Sartre says is impossible.  
To emphasize the union or bond between subjects present in 
love, Marcel speaks of “the indistinctness of the I and the thou” and 
states that love relations transcend the “categories of the same and 
the other.” That is, subjects united in love do not fuse into one and the 
same being and yet they are not separate or distinct from each other. 
They are really united in a “suprapersonal unity,” Marcel states, but it 
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is a unity which promotes the integrity and well being of each person. 
Each lover’s being is enhanced by sharing and participating in the life 
and experiences of the beloved. Neither is diminished or destroyed for 
each lover respects the reality of the beloved and desires his/her 
fulfillment. All this Marcel claims is revealed by an unbiased 
phenomenological description oflove.48 But, of course, Sartre too 
claims to use the phenomenological method. Why, then, does the 
author of Being and Nothingness deny the possibility of subject-to-
subject relations and unions?  
Marcel believes that it is because Sartre conceives all 
interpersonal unions, including love, as material or physical in 
character. A physical union of two or more entities involves a physical 
modification or even destruction of one or both of them, as in a 
chemical or biological reaction. When a lion physically “unites” with a 
lamb by eating it, the latter is no longer a separate living organism but 
part of the lion. Just so, if love’s intersubjective union is considered to 
be physical, then it will be viewed as an attempt to modify and control 
others, if not to destroy them—as Sartre does.49  
Love should rather be understood as a spiritual union, Marcel 
says. It is a genuine union but not one which physically disturbs the 
lover or the beloved. My wife does not change color or gain an inch or 
lose a pound from our loving bond. Of course, our spiritual oneness 
will affect each of us internally since we participate in each other’s 
lives. My wife’s joys and sorrows, her search for meaning and 
happiness truly become part of me and my life. Yet at the same time 
my love recognizes and affirms her as she is; after all it is she that I 
know and love.  
C. Evaluation of Marcel’s criticisms: Sartre’s posthumous 
publication, Notebooks for an Ethics, makes it perfectly clear that he 
never intended to claim that the conflictual relations described in the 
ontology of Being and Nothingness were the only possible human 
relations. In the Notebooks he acknowledges that subjects can relate 
to each other primarily as subjects, or more precisely as subject/object 
to subject/object (since we can’t totally avoid objectifying others). 
Notebooks also recognizes that to objectify other subjects does not 
inevitably degrade or alienate or enslave them, provided that we 
recognize them first and foremost as free subjects.50 Perhaps most 
important Sartre explicitly states there that Being and Nothingness 
was not an attempt to set forth the necessary structure of all human 
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relations but only those of unconverted individuals, individuals who 
attempt to use or to eliminate others in order to become causa sui, 
God. If one recognizes the futility of pursuing that unattainable goal, 
he or she can undertake a ,conversion which as we saw in the previous 
section means the refusal to value or seek becoming God and hence 
the refusal to try and use others to attain that end. Early in his 
Notebooks, Sartre states that “the struggle of consciousnesses only 
makes sense before conversion.” After conversion “there is no 
ontological reason to stay on the level of struggle.” And in an explicit 
reference to Being and Nothingness, he asserts that conversion can 
transform the “hell” of human relations described there.51  
In Notebooks Sartre also urges the adoption of an attitude of 
generosity toward others by which he means an attitude of willing and 
assisting them in achieving their freely chosen goals. He labels this 
attitude “authentic love” in order to clearly distinguish it from the love 
described in the earlier work. Furthermore, Sartre says, authentic love 
consists of unity between persons, “a certain kind of interpenetration 
of freedoms” where “each freedom is wholly in the other one.” This 
unity, he explains, overcomes radical separation and otherness: 
“otherness is replaced by unity, even though ontically, otherness 
always remains.” Otherness always remains because the unity in 
authentic love, Sartre insists, is not an ontological fusion of individual 
subjects into one supraindividual being but is rather a unity on the 
plane of will and action.52 I will return to this point below.  
Sartre’s recognition and appreciation of the positive side of 
human relations reaches its culmination in his last major work, The 
Family Idiot. There he describes in great detail our basic human need 
to be loved (authentically), respected and valued by others. Only if we 
are loved can we come to value and love ourselves and believe that we 
have a mandate for our existence and that our lives have purpose.53  
Thus, I believe that Marcel’s criticism that Sartre recognizes 
only the negative side of human relations is not accurate since Sartre 
never intended to say that all relationships were of that kind. Marcel 
was not aware that Sartre’s descriptions of human relations in Being 
and Nothingness were to be taken as descriptions of relations between 
unconverted individuals; although I must add that Sartre did give 
some hints of that in Being and Nothingness, hints that almost none of 
his contemporaries caught.54 Once the latter’s Notebooks for an Ethics 
were published, seven years after Marcel’s death and three after 
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Sartre’s, it was abundantly clear that he, like Marcel, believed that 
positive human relations (such as authentic love and generosity) were 
not only possible but absolutely necessary for human beings to have 
meaningful lives.  
Still, while both men are in agreement about the importance of 
human love, I should note that there is an important difference 
between the two men’s understanding of the bond of love. For Sartre 
the unity of lovers occurs only in will and action, that is, lovers choose 
and act for each other’s well being. A real ontological bond between 
them is impossible. For Marcel, human love does consist of a real 
union between the lovers, a oneness which is spiritual in nature for it 
unites the subjects together at the same time that it respects and 
enhances the integrity and well being of each of them.  
 
God  
I will conclude by addressing the most profound disagreement 
between Sartre and Marcel-the reality of God.  
A. Sartre’s position: Actually, the atheistic existentialist does not 
spend much time attempting to prove that God does not exist. His 
argument is basically that the very idea of God is self-contradictory, 
but that, of course, depends entirely on what he means by God. 
Technically, Sartre defines God as an impossible combination of being-
for-itself and being-in-itself. God would be a being that is conscious 
and free on the one hand, which he calls “nonbeing” since it is the 
polar opposite of being-in-itself, combined with the total fullness of 
being-in-itself on the other. Since being for itself, free human 
consciousness, is defined as a lack or nothingness of being, it can not 
survive if it combines with being in itself which is a complete fullness 
of being.55  
Sartre also defines God as an ens causa sui, a being what would 
freely cause itself to be necessary or, to put it another way, a being 
which makes itself necessary by freely conferring on itself a right to 
be. However, Sartre argues that in order to cause itself to be 
necessary, God must first (ontologically not temporally) be and so the 
God-cause at the origin of God-caused would not itself be caused but 
be contingent and unnecessary. Thus he writes, “God if he exists [as 
causa sui] is contingent.”56 But a contingent being cannot cause itself 
to be necessary for the idea of a being which is both contingent and 
necessary is self-contradictory.  
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Needless to say, if one does not accept Sartre’s division of 
reality into being-for itself and being-in-itself, and as we saw in 
Section I Marcel does not, and does not consider the impossible 
combination of them to be God, and Marcel does not, Sartre’s 
reasoning is not convincing. Likewise, if one does not accept ens causa 
sui as a definition of God, and Marcel does not, Sartre’s argument that 
such a God is impossible is irrelevant.  
In my opinion, Sartre’s more cogent and challenging reasons for 
denying God’s existence are found in his attack on the traditional 
notion of God as the creator of all that is. He argues that there are 
only two ways to understand creation and neither of them make 
sense.57 Either God creates something remains within his being and 
then it is not a creature which possesses own existence, and so it 
simply “dissolves” in its creator. Or God creates something which is 
truly “distinct from and opposed to its creator” but then it possesses 
its own “being beyond the creation.” Such a being, truly distinct its 
creator, Sartre states, “is its own support, it does not preserve the 
trace of divine creation.” In other words, he denies the possibility that 
could create a creature truly distinct or separate from himself whose 
would remain totally and continuously dependent on him. That is the 
Sartre claims that the theory of perpetual creation, namely, the view a 
creature is continuously created at each moment of its existence, 
removes all substantiality or independence of that creature from its 
creator.58 Again, if God creates something that is continuously 
dependent on him every moment of its being, then that created thing 
can not be really separate or distinct from its creator. Apparently, in 
Sartre’s eyes a creature must be completely independent of its creator 
for it to have its own being distinct from that creator.  
But why couldn’t something be created to be distinct from its 
creator at the same time that its being is totally dependent on its 
creator? Sartre suggests another argument based on passivity and 
activity.59 If a being continually receives all that it is from a creator, 
that makes it totally passive in relation to its creator. However, a being 
that is totally passive does not even exercise its own particular 
existence. For something to be in itself a being really separate and 
distinct from its creator, it has to have and to exercise its own 
existence, it cannot just be part of the creator’s existence. But if it 
assumes and exercises its own being and thus actually is distinct from 
its creator’s being, then it cannot be totally passive and so cannot be 
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created. Sartre cannot see how a creature that receives everything 
that it is at every moment can possess any intrinsic independence or 
reality of its own in relation to its creator.  
B. Marcel’s alternative: I use the term alternative here rather 
than criticism because Marcel does not directly address any of Sartre’s 
arguments against creation. In fact, he too has serious reservations 
about the traditional understanding of creation, in particular its use of 
the category of causality to explain God’s production of creatures. He 
seems to consider causality to involve a determined relation between 
physical objects; a cause is a physical entity which transmits a certain 
power or force that modifies another physical entity.60 Yet he 
recognizes that physical powers are not the only kind of powers human 
beings experience. We speak of the power of truth, the power of art, 
the power of love, and it is in terms of that last power that Marcel tries 
to explain the nature of Divine creation.  
He suggests that we view the relation between a creator God 
and creatures not in tenns of causality but as the bestowing of a gift. 
That is, the creator is not a first cause but a loving father whose 
creatures are his freely offered gifts. To call creatures gifts is to say 
that they are neither deserved, nor required, nor necessitated. Their 
reality is bestowed freely, gratuitously, and generously by infinite 
love.61 And he attempts to understand creation out of love by 
reflecting on our experience of human love. As we saw in Section IV, 
Marcel’s description of human love reveals that it is a power, in the 
sense that it has real effects on the loved one and the lover, yet it is 
not a power which tries to dominate or control the beloved. Love 
respects the beloved and seeks to enhance his or her being. When I 
realize I am loved, I experience that I am not a solitary individual 
doomed to search alone for a meaningful live. I have companions, 
friends, lovers who value me and join with me to support my search 
for fulfillment and happiness. Another’s love refreshes me and renews 
my energy; it may empower me to attempt to attain goals I would 
never have the courage to attempt on my own. It may reveal and 
strengthen dimensions of myself (e.g. my gentleness, my kindness, 
my commitment and perseverance) that I hardly realized I possessed. 
Most especially, another’s love of me reveals that I possess value, that 
my life has significance beyond what I alone can give it.  
Yet at the same time that love affects the beloved in the ways 
just mentioned, love also respects the integrity of the beloved. As we 
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noted above, Marcel believes that love is a spiritual union between 
lover and beloved. The lover identifies his or her self with the beloved 
and participates in his or her life and experiences. And such 
participation does not absorb or destroy the beloved but respects the 
beloved as he or she is—after all, it is he or she that I love. My love 
seeks to promote the other. It is the beloved’s well-being and 
happiness that I seek and join with my own.  
Accordingly, to view creative love as analogous to human love, 
as Marcel does, is to view God as a loving father whose all powerful 
love wills all things into being and at the same time voluntarily 
withholds itself for the good of its creatures. Just as human love seeks 
the well being of the beloved, absolute creative love respects the gifts 
it bestows and seeks their good, even to the point of allowing human 
freedom to reject that love and its gifts.  
C. Sartre’s response: Sartre never directly addresses Marcel’s 
notion of creation. However, as we saw in the previous section, in his 
Notebooks he does describe generosity and authentic love as both 
respecting others and as assisting them in attaining their goals. In The 
Family Idiot the love of others is a power which is essential for us to 
fulfill our needs and live a meaningful life; it is not a power which 
diminishes our freedom but one which enhances it. Sartre does not 
pursue this beyond the human realm, although he does speak of our 
religious instinct which is a desire deep within us for a meaning for our 
lives that would make us essential to something or someone that is 
absolute. We desire a justification for our lives, he says, that could 
come only from an almighty, infinite being who created us for some 
purpose in his grand design. One very interesting feature of our need 
for a creator in Sartre’s last work is that it does not appear to be 
identical to the earlier desire to be God which he described in Being 
and Nothingness. The religious instinct is described as a need for 
justification and meaning given by a loving creator, not a need to be a 
creator who is cause of itself. Of course Sartre’s atheism has no room 
for any God and so our religious instinct cannot be satisfied. Still, since 
he acknowledges our complete dependence on the love of others for 
our fulfillment and also recognizes that that love is not inimical to our 
freedom and our flourishing, he has less reason to be suspicious of a 
God like Marcel’s who creates entirely out of love.  
 One final remark. I trust that this paper has made it clear that 
most of Marcel’s criticisms of Sartre’s views apply only to the latter’s 
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early ontology set forth primarily in Being and Nothingness. It may be 
that those criticisms were a stimulus for some of the changes Sartre 
made in that ontology. In any case, one thing is certain, Marcel was 
dead wrong when he wrote in 1946 that Sartre would never “put forth 
the heroic effort ...required for a serious reconsideration” of his early 
views and that “his views will harden still further.”62 Whatever one 
thinks of Sartre, I believe he must be given a great deal of credit for 
having the courage to reconsider and revise his views, sometimes 
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